The philosophy of Spinoza can hardly be said to have been in the fore-front of recent developments in the philosophy of mind. Notwithstanding, Stuart Hampshire has put himself on record as saying “that in the philosophy of mind he [Spinoza] is nearer to the truth at certain points than any other philosopher ever has been.” The purpose of this paper is to get even nearer the truth with Spinoza’s leading. The idea of the body is, however, a confused idea; so (...) confused, in fact, that Spinoza was never able to form an adequate idea of the idea. I wish to argue that Spinoza has even worse reasons than Descartes for taking the idea of the body to be the idea of something that “actually exists.” Lacking any appeal to the divine veracity, Spinoza’s contention that the body does exist constitutes a standing petitio for the whole of the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

I attempt a thorough delineation of hocking's multiangular argument, and historically trace its genis to sources in james and royce. i argue that royce's logic of triadic relations shows the james-hocking to be untenable, and that hocking's version of intersubjectivity must be taken as an expression of tacit or autobiographical knowledge.

To me the decisive reason in favor of our minds meeting in some common objects at least is that, unless I make that supposition, I have no motive for assuming that your mind exists at all.